# SES Guide

This is a guide to understanding SES (Secure ECMAScript). It:

  • Shows what you can and cannot do with a SES-using JavaScript program.
  • Defines what SES is and does.
  • Provides background on why JavaScript functionality was added, removed, or changed.
  • Describes realms and compartments.

This is intended for initial reading when starting to use or learn about Agoric. For those knowledgeable about or experienced with SES, see the SES Reference for to use SES without much explanation.

# What is SES?

SES (Secure ECMAScript):

  • Is a JavaScript runtime library for safely running third-party code.
  • Addresses JavaScript’s lack of internal security.
    • This is particularly significant because JavaScript applications use and rely on third-party code (modules, packages, libraries, user-provided code for extensions and plug-ins, etc.).
  • Enforces best practices by removing hazardous features such as global mutable state and lack of encapsulation in sloppy mode.
  • Is a safe deterministic subset of "strict mode" JavaScript.
  • Does not include any IO objects that provide ambient authority (opens new window).
  • Removes non-determinism by modifying a few built-in objects.
  • Adds functionality to freeze and make immutable both built-in JavaScript objects and program created objects and make them immutable.

# The SES story

JavaScript was created to let web surfers safely run programs from strangers. Web pages put JavaScript programs in a sandbox that restricts their abilities while maximizing utility.

This worked well until web applications started inviting multiple strangers into the same sandbox. But they continued to depend on a security model where every stranger had their own sandbox.

Meanwhile, server-side JavaScript applications imbued their sandbox with unbounded abilities and ran programs written by strangers. They were vulnerable to both their dependencies and also the rarely reviewed dependencies of their dependencies.

SES uses a finer grain security model, Object Capabilities or OCaps. With OCaps, many strangers can collaborate in a single sandbox, without risking them frustrating, interfering, or conspiring with or against the user or each other.

To do this, SES hardens the entire surface of the JavaScript environment. The only way a program can subvert or communicate with another program is to have been expressly granted a reference to an object provided by that other program.

Any programming environment fitting the OCaps model satisfies three requirements:

  • Any program can protect its invariants by hiding its own data and capabilities.
  • Power can only be exercised over something by having a reference to the object providing that power, for example, a file system object. A reference to a powerful object is a capability.
  • The only way to get a capability is by being given one. For example, by receiving one as an argument of a constructor or method.

Ordinary JavaScript does not fully qualify as an OCaps language due to the pervasive mutability of shared objects. You can construct a JavaScript subset with a transitively immutable environment without any unintended capabilities. Starting in 2007 with ECMAScript 5, Agoric engineers and the OCap community have influenced JavaScript’s evolution so a program can transform its own environment into this safe JavaScript environment.

As of February 2021, SES is making its way through JavaScript standards committees. It is expected to become official JavaScript when the standards process is completed. Meanwhile, Agoric provides its own SES shim (a library providing the needed SES features) for writing secure smart contracts in JavaScript. Note that several Agoric engineers are on the relevant standards committees and are responsible for aspects of SES, so our SES should be very close to the eventual standards.

# Using SES with your code

The SES shim transforms ordinary JavaScript environments into SES environments.

On Node.js you can import or require ses in either CommonJS or ECMAScript modules, then call lockdown(). This is a shim. It mutates the environment in place so any code running after the shim can assume it’s running in a SES environment. This includes the globals lockdown(), harden(), Compartment, and so on. For example:



import 'ses';

To ensure a module runs in a SES environment, wrap the above code in a ses-lockdown.js module and import it:

import './non-ses-code-before-lockdown.js';
import './ses-lockdown.js'; // calls lockdown.
import './ses-code-after-lockdown.js';

To use SES as a script on the web, use the UMD build.

<script src="node_modules/ses/dist/ses.umd.min.js">

The full SES environment's module system requires a translating compiler. There is a much thinner SES version that just provides an evaluator Compartment. For it, use the much smaller ses/lockdown layer. Especially if all client code gets bundled as a script out-of-band.

import 'ses/lockdown';
<script src="node_modules/ses/dist/lockdown.umd.min.js"></script>

# What SES does to JavaScript

As mentioned, SES does not include any IO objects providing "unsafe" ambient authority (opens new window). It also doesn't allow non-determinism from built-in JavaScript objects.

As of SES-0.8.0/Fall 2020, Agoric's SES source code (opens new window) defines a subset of the globals defined by the baseline JavaScript language specification. SES includes these globals:

  • Object
  • Array
  • Number
  • Map
  • WeakMap
  • Number
  • BigInt
  • Intl
  • Math all features except
    • Math.random() is disabled (calling it throws an error) as an obvious source of
  • Date all features except
    • Date.now() returns NaN
    • new Date(nonNumber) or Date(anything) return a Date that stringifies to "Invalid Date"

Much of the Intl package, and some other objects' locale-specific aspects (e.g. Number.prototype.toLocaleString) have results that depend upon which locale is configured. This varies from one process to another. See lockdown() for how those are handled.

SES freezes primordials; built-in JavaScript objects such as Object, Array, and RegExp, and their prototype chains. globalThis is also frozen. This prevents malicious code from changing their behavior (imagine Array.prototype.push delivering a copy of its argument to an attacker, or ignoring certain values). It also prevents using, for example, Object.heyBuddy or globalThis.heyBuddy as an ambient communication channel via setting a property and another program periodically reading it. This would violate object-capability discipline; objects may only communicate through references.

Both frozen primordials and a frozen globalThis have problems with a few JavaScript libraries that add new features to built-in objects (shims/polyfills). These libraries stretch best practices' boundaries by adding new features to built-in objects in a way SES Compartments don't allow.

# What SES removes from standard JavaScript

Almost all existing JavaScript code runs under Node.js or inside a browser, so it's easy to conflate environment features with JavaScript. For example, you may be surprised that Buffer and require are Node.js additions. Also setTimeout(), setInterval(), URL, atob(), btoa(), TextEncoder, and TextDecoder are additions to the programming environment standardized by the web, and are not intrinsic to JavaScript.

Most Node.js-specific global objects (opens new window) are unavailable including:

  • queueMicrotask
  • URL and URLSearchParams
  • WebAssembly
  • TextEncoder and TextDecoder
  • global
    • Use globalThis instead (and remember it is frozen).
  • process
    • No process.env to access the process's environment variables.
    • No process.argv for the argument array.
  • Buffer (consider using TypedArray instead, but see below)
  • setImmediate/clearImmediate
    • You can generally replace setImmediate(fn) with Promise.resolve().then(_ => fn()) to defer execution of fn until after the current event/callback finishes processing. But it won't run until after all other ready Promise callbacks execute.

      There are two queues: the IO queue (accessed by setImmediate), and the Promise queue (accessed by Promise resolution). SES code can add to the Promise queue, but needs to be given a capability to be able to add to the IO queue. Note that the Promise queue is higher-priority than the IO queue, so the Promise queue must be empty for any IO or timers to be handled.

  • setInterval and setTimeout (and clearInterval/clearTimeout)
    • Any notion of time must come from exchanging messages with external timer services (the SwingSet environment provides a TimerService object to the bootstrap vat, which can share it with other vats)

None of the huge list of other Browser environment features (opens new window) presented as names in the global scope (some also added to Node.js) are available in a SES environment. The most surprising removals include atob, TextEncoder, and URL.

debugger is a first-class JavaScript statement, and behaves as expected.

# What SES adds to standard Javascript

The following anticipate additional proposed standard-track features. If they become standards, future JavaScript environments will include them as global objects. So the current Agoric SES shim makes those global objects available.

  • console is available for debugging. While not in the official spec, since all implementations add it, leaving it out would cause confusion. Note that console.log’s exact behavior is up to the host program; display to the operator is not guaranteed. Use the console for debug information only. The console is not obliged to write to the POSIX standard output.

  • lockdown() and harden() both freeze an object’s API surface (enumerable data properties). A hardened object’s properties cannot be changed, only read, so the only way to interact with a hardened object is through its methods. harden() is similar to Object.freeze() but more thorough. See the individual lockdown() and harden() sections below.

  • [Compartment](https://github.com/endojs/endo/tree/SES-v0.8.0/packages/ses#compartment) is a global. Code runs inside a Compartment and can create sub-compartments to host other code (with different globals or transforms). Note that these child compartments get harden() and Compartment.

# Realms

Agoric deploy scripts and smart contract code run in an immutable realm with Compartments providing just enough authority to create useful and secure contracts. But not enough authority to do anything unintended or harmful to the participants of the smart contract.

JavaScript code runs in the context of a Realm (opens new window). A realm is the set of primordials (objects and standard library functions like Array.prototype.push) and a global object. In a web browser, an iframe is a realm. In Node.js, a Node process is a realm.

For historical reasons, the ECMAScript specification requires primordials be mutable (Array.prototype.push = yourFunction is valid ECMAScript but not recommended). By using the Agoric SES shim and calling lockdown(), you can turn the current realm into an immutable realm; a realm within which the primordials are deeply frozen.

SES also lets programs create Compartments. These are "mini-realms". A Compartment has its own dedicated global object and environment, but it inherits the primordials from their parent realm. Components are described in detail in the next section.

# Compartments

A compartment is an execution environment for evaluating a stranger’s code. It has its own globalThis global object and wholly independent system of modules. Otherwise it shares the same batch of intrinsics such as Array with its surrounding compartment. The concept of a compartment implies an initial compartment, the initial execution environment of a realm. After lockdown is called, all compartments share the same frozen realm.

Here we create a compartment with a print() function on globalThis.

import 'ses';

const c = new Compartment({
  print: harden(console.log),

  print('Hello! Hello?');

This new compartment has a different global object than the start compartment. We posit that all JavaScript executes in a realm and compartment. Every realm has distinct intrinsics, whereas every compartment shares intrinsics. The initial realm and compartment are not constructed with new Realm() or new Compartment() but that’s invisible to the code running; they could just as well be running within a constructed realm or compartment.

We call the one compartment in a realm that was not expressly constructed the start compartment. The start compartment receives some ambient authorities from the host, often access to timers and IO that are denied to other compartments. Running lockdown does not erase these powerful objects, but puts the program running in the start compartment on a footing where it is possible to carefully delegate powers to child compartments.

The global object is initially mutable. Locking down the realm hardened the objects in global scope. After lockdown, no compartment can tamper with these intrinsics and undeniable objects. Many of these are identical in the new compartment.

const c = new Compartment();
c.globalThis === globalThis; // false
c.globalThis.JSON === JSON; // true

Other pairs of compartments also share many identical intrinsics and undeniable objects of the realm. Each has a unique, initially mutable, global object.

const c1 = new Compartment();
const c2 = new Compartment();
c1.globalThis === c2.globalThis; // false
c1.globalThis.JSON === c2.globalThis.JSON; // true

Every compartment's global scope includes a shallow, specialized copy of the JavaScript intrinsics. These omit Date.now() and Math.random() since they can be covert inter-program communication channels.

However, a compartment may be expressly given access to these objects through the compartment constructor's first argument or by assigning them to the compartment's globalThis after construction.

const powerfulCompartment = new Compartment({ Math });
powerfulCompartment.globalThis.Date = Date;

When you create a new Compartment object, you must decide if it supports OCaps security. If it does, run harden(compartment.globalThis) on it before loading any untrusted code into it.

A single compartment can run a JavaScript program in the locked-down SES environment. However, most interesting programs have multiple modules. So, each compartment also has its own module system. SES version 0.8.0 adds support for ECMAScript modules, a relatively new system supported by many browsers, and officially released in Node.js 14.

Compartments can be linked, so one compartment can export a module that another compartment imports. Each compartment may have its own rules for how to resolve import specifiers and how to locate and retrieve modules. In the following example, we use the compartment constructor to create two compartments: one for the application and another for its dependency.

The resolveHook is synchronous and determines how to compute the full module specifier for a partially resolved module specifier in ESM source text, like import "./even.js" as it appears in ./math/odd.js corresponds to ./math/even.js in a Node.js program.

The importHook is asynchronous and responsible for for locating, retrieving, and parsing modules. Retrieving is getting the source text from the web, archive, or database based on its location. Converting a module specifier to a location is an internal concern of the importHook and the particular storage medium for the module texts, but should generally be a URL and may appear in stack traces. The importHook may use the ModuleStaticRecord constructor to create a reusable, parsed representation of the module text.

const dependency = new Compartment({}, {}, {
  resolveHook: (moduleSpecifier, moduleReferrer) =>
    resolve(moduleSpecifier, moduleReferrer),
  importHook: async moduleSpecifier => {
    const moduleLocation = locate(moduleSpecifier);
    const moduleText = await retrieve(moduleLocation);
    return new ModuleStaticRecord(moduleText, moduleLocation);
const application = new Compartment({}, {
  'dependency': dependency.module('./main.js'),
}, {

Compartments provide a low-level loader API for JavaScript modules. Your code might run in compartments, but they are an implementation detail of tools and runtimes.

Vats in the Agoric runtime use compartments to isolate contracts within a vat. A vat can use multiple comparments. MetaMask’s LavaMoat uses a Compartment for every module, to create boundaries between application code and third-party dependencies.

The lifetime of a compartment is bounded by garbage collection and the lifetime of the realm that contains them. You will not ever have to tear down or delete one.

# lockdown()

lockdown() freezes all JavaScript defined objects accessible to any program in the execution environment. Calling lockdown() turns a JavaScript system into a SES system, with enforced OCap (object-capability) security. It alters the surrounding execution environment (realm) such that no two programs running in the same realm can observe or interfere with each other until they have been introduced.

To do this, lockdown() tamper-proofs all of the JavaScript intrinsics to prevent prototype pollution. After that, no program can subvert the methods of these objects (preventing some man in the middle attacks). Also, no program can use these mutable objects to pass notes to parties that haven't been expressly introduced (preventing some covert communication channels).

For a full explanation of lockdown() and its options, please click here.

# harden()

harden() is automatically provided by SES. Any code that will run inside a vat or a contract can use harden as a global, without importing anything. The Agoric programming environment defines objects (mint, issuer, zcf, etc.) that shouldn't need hardening as their constructors do that work. You mainly need to harden records, callbacks, and ephemeral objects.

harden() must be called on all objects that will be transferred across a trust boundary The general rule is if you make a new object and give it to someone else (and don't immediately forget it yourself), you should give them harden(obj) instead of the raw object. This ensures other objects can only interact with them through their defined method interface, i.e. the functions in the object's API. CapTP, our communications layer for passing references to distributed objects, enforces this at vat boundaries.

Hardening an instance also hardens its class.

You can send a message to a hardened object. If it's a record, you can access its properties and their values. Being hardened doesn't preclude an object from having access to mutable state (harden(new Map()) still behaves like a normal mutable Map), but it means their methods stay the same and can't be surprisingly changed by someone else.

Tip: If your text editor/IDE complains about harden() not being defined or imported, try adding /* global harden */ to the top of the file.

You use harden() like this:

const o = {a: 2};
o.a  = 12;
console.log(o.a); // 12 because o is still mutable
o.a  = 37; // throws a TypeError because o is now hardened

# lockdown() and harden()

lockdown() and harden() essentially do the same thing; freeze objects so their properties cannot be changed. The only way to interact with frozen objects is through their methods. Their differences are what objects you use them on, and when you use them.

lockdown() must be called first. It hardens JavaScript's built-in primordials (implicitly shared global objects) and enables harden(). If you call harden() before lockdown() excutes, it throws an error.

lockdown() works on objects created by the JavaScript language itself as part of its definition. Use harden() to freeze objects created after lockdown()was called; i.e. objects created by programs written in JavaScript.

# Library compatibility

Programs running under SES can use import or require() to import other libraries consisting only of SES-compatible JavaScript code. This includes a significant part of the NPM registry.

However, many NPM packages use built-in Node.js modules. If used at import time (in their top-level code), SES-enabled code cannot use the package and fails to load at all. If they use the built-in features at runtime, then the package can load. However, it might fail later when an invoked function accesses the missing functionality. So some NPM packages are partially compatible; usable if you don't invoke certain features.

The same is true for NPM packages that use missing globals, or attempt to modify frozen primordials.

The SES wiki (opens new window) tracks compatibility reports for NPM packages, including potential workarounds.

# HTML comments

JavaScript parsers may not recognize HTML comments within source code, potentially causing different behavior on different engines. For safety, the Agoric SES shim rejects any source code containing a comment open (<!--) or close (-->) sequence. However, its filter uses a regular expression, not a full parser. It unnecessarily rejects any source code containing either of the strings <!-- or -->, even if neither marks a comment.

# Dynamic import expressions

The "dynamic import expression" (import('path')) enables code to load dependencies at runtime. It returns a promise resolving to the module namespace object. While it takes the form of a function call, it's actually not a function call, but is instead JavaScript syntax. As such it would let vat code bypass the shim's Compartment's module map. For safety, the SES shim rejects code that looks like it uses a dynamic import expression.

The regular expression for this pattern is safe and should never allow any use of dynamic import, however obfuscated the usage is. Because of this, it may be confused into falsely rejecting legitimate code.

For example, the word “import” near a parenthesis or at the end of a line inside a comment is identified as a disallowed use of import() and falsely rejected:

// This function calculates the import
// duties paid on the merchandise..

But the following obfuscated dynamic import usage is rightly rejected:

sneaky = import
// comment to hide invocation

# Direct vs. indirect eval expressions

A direct eval, invoked as eval(code), behaves as if code were expanded in place. The evaluated code sees the same scope as the eval itself sees, so this code can reference x:

function foo(code) {
  const x = 1;

If you perform a direct eval, you cannot hide your internal authorities from the code being evaluated.

In contrast, an indirect eval only gets the global scope, not the local scope. In a safe SES environment, indirect eval is a useful and common tool. The evaluated code can only access global objects, and those are all safe (and frozen). The only bad thing an indirect eval can do is consume unbounded CPU or memory. Once you've evaluated the code, you can invoke it with arguments to give it as many or as few authorities as you like.

The most common way to invoke an indirect eval is (1,eval)(code).

The SES proposal does not change how direct and indirect eval work. However, the SES shim cannot correctly emulate a direct eval. If it tried, it would perform an indirect eval. This could be pretty confusing, because the evaluated code would not use objects from the local scope as expected. Furthermore, in the future when SES is natively implemented by JavaScript engines, the behavior would revert to direct eval, allowing access to anything in scope.

To avoid this confusion and compatibility risk, the shim uses a regular expression to reject code that looks like it is performing a direct eval. This regexp is not complete (you can trick it into allowing a direct eval), but that’s safe because it really performs an indirect eval. Our goal is just to guide people away from confusing and non-compliant behaviors early in their development process.

This regexp falsely rejects occurrences inside static strings and comments.